NEWS UPDATE AUGUST 2003
SINO-TIBETAN DIALOGUE: TALKS OR TOURISM?
by Warren Smith
The recent visits of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the delegation of the Tibetan Government in Exile to China may have revealed the limits of Sino-Tibetan dialogue. The section on Tibet of the joint declaration issued during Vajpayee's visit says: "The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about independence of Tibet."
China characterized the Indian statement as the first time that India had explicitly recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. However, India denied that its position on Tibet had changed. China claimed that India had recognized that Tibet was an inalienable part of China. The Indian side denied that the word inalienable was used. India also denied that the Dalai Lama's status as a respected guest in India would change in any way; however, it did narrowly define the Dalai Lama's role as exclusively a religious leader of Tibet.
The Indian statement used "Tibet Autonomous Region" instead of "Tibet," a terminology preferred by China presumably because TAR is an administrative unit of China whereas "Tibet" invokes images of a country. India has always said that it would limit the anti-Chinese activities of Tibetans in India; however, it is unlikely that China's expectations in this regard are consistent with those of India. China's relentless attempts to circumscribe Tibet's political identity as well as its attempts to limit the anti-Chinese activities of Tibetans and their supporters in India and elsewhere would call into question Dharamsala's optimistic predictions that an improvement in Sino-Indian relations will lead to negotiations about Tibet.
After the most recent Dharamsala delegation visit to China, the delegation leaders reported that they thought that they had improved relations with Chinese leaders, increased the Chinese officials' confidence in dealing with representatives of the Dalai Lama and, hopefully, created conditions for a dialogue about Tibet. The delegation leaders, however, had little evidence, except the fact of the visit itself, to justify their optimism. In the only statement about the result of meetings with Chinese officials, delegation leader Lodi Gyari said that Chinese officials had "explicitly acknowledged the positive efforts made by the Tibetan leadership to create a conducive environment for the continuation of the process." Both sides suggested that further similar steps should be taken to create such an environment conducive for contacts and to create mutual understanding and trust. Samdhong Rinpoche, chairman of the Kashag, immediately expressed his "determination to continue the present course of creating a conducive atmosphere for the continuation of the process of dialogue."
What both sides mean by a "conducive environment" is a limitation on anti-Chinese activities by Tibetans in exile and their supporters. In particular, Samdhong Rinpoche had suggested to Tibetans in exile and to Tibetan support groups that they should support the dialogue process by refraining from demonstrating in favor of Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama had also cancelled a scheduled visit to Taiwan, in order to avoid offending China, and, during a recent European visit, he had said that he was in agreement with the One-China policy, implying his recognition that Taiwan is part of China.
Critics complained that the Chinese side had taken no similar steps; in fact, since the first delegation visit in September, the Chinese had sentenced Tenzin Delek Rinpoche to death and executed Lobsang Dhondup, had objected to all the Dalai Lama's international visits, and had pressured Nepal to return 18 Tibetan refugees from Nepal to Tibet. In fact, China took the opportunity of the delegation's visit to issue an article stating that there was no issue of Tibet about which it should engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama, that the Dalai Lama did not represent the interests of the Tibetan people, and that Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule was exclusively the product of American imperialist interference in Tibet.
The article in question was issued by the State Council Information Office under the name of Hua Zi, which means "Children of China," and is widely assumed to be a pseudonym. The State Council article reiterated China's conditions for dialogue, that the Dalai Lama should abandon his claim for the independence of Tibet, halt any separatist activities, and state that he recognizes Tibet and Taiwan as inalienable parts of China. The article implied that the Dalai Lama had fulfilled none of these conditions, which makes the Dalai Lama's acceptance of the One China principle seem a futile attempt to appease China.
China's intransigence on the Tibet issue leads to questions about why it has allowed the recent Government in Exile delegation visits. A pragmatist would have to say that the reason is exactly what the Chinese have said it is. During the delegation's latest visit the Chinese said that they hoped that the Tibetans would see how much China and Tibet had changed so that the Dalai Lama could "make the correct choice." Presumably this means that he should give up his futile attempt to separate Tibet from China. The Chinese have also said that they hoped the Tibetan side would continue to discourage anti-Chinese activities of Tibetans in exile. In this way the Chinese apparently hope to silence the Tibetan Government in exile by playing upon its hope for negotiations. The Chinese will then be able to pretend, as they maintain in their official policy, that there is no issue of Tibet. If this interpretation of Chinese intentions is correct, it makes the delegation visits appear more like tourist trips than dialogue.
Such has been the nature of Sino-Tibetan dialogue since it began in 1979. The conditions were created for Sino-Tibetan dialogue by the death of Mao in 1976, the Dalai Lama's definition of the Tibetan issue as the "happiness" of the Tibetan people, and Deng Xiaoping's initiative in offering to talk with the Dalai Lama about his "return to the Motherland." The Dalai Lama's definition of the issue as the "happiness" of the Tibetan people was apparently satisfying to the Chinese Government since it relegated the issue of Tibet to one that China could claim to have satisfactorily resolved. Rather than define the issue as Tibet's political status or even the survival of Tibetan culture and national identity, the Dalai Lama's vague definition theoretically removed those issues from contention. This satisfied China's demand that no such issues could be discussed. Despite Deng's conditions for dialogue being interpreted by the Tibetan side as "anything but independence can be discussed," what he actually meant was that nothing involving the political issue could be discussed, since all political issues of Tibet evolve from the Tibetan claim to independence. Thus nothing about the political status of Tibet was open to discussion, including the nature of Tibetan autonomy and the territorial extent of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Subsequent events proved the accuracy of this interpretation. The Chinese refused to discuss any aspects of the Tibetan issue except the personal status of the Dalai Lama and refused to admit that there was any issue of Tibet's political status.
Sino-Tibetan dialogue during the 1980s reached an impasse due to these restrictions. The Tibetan side decided that it could achieve more leverage on the issue by cultivating international support. This strategy was remarkably successful in achieving an international status for the Tibet issue but it failed to produce any movement on the Chinese side. Recently, however, there have been two Tibetan Government in Exile delegation visits to China that have raised the hopes of the exiles as well as of Tibetans inside Tibet. However, the previous restrictions are still relevant. In addition, it seems the Chinese expect, as in the period of delegation visits of 1979-85, that the Tibetans will be so impressed by developments in Tibet that they will realize the futility of any hope for a return to Tibet's former cultural and political systems.
The primary purpose of Sino-Tibetan dialogue from China's point of view is apparently to make the Tibetan issue go away rather than to resolve it. This is obvious from China's consistent position that there is no political issue of Tibet. China cannot admit to any political issue of Tibet since that would call into question the legitimacy of its 1950-51 "peaceful liberation." China may once have truly intended to allow a large degree of Tibetan autonomy, as was promised in the 1951 17-Point Agreement. China, however, greatly underestimated Tibet's distinct national identity and Tibetans' desire to preserve their independence. Whenever China has allowed a modicum of autonomy in Tibet, as in the period 1957-59 and 1979-89, Tibetan nationalism has rapidly coalesced into anti-Chinese resistance. Since 1989 China has instituted a policy in Tibet of restrictions on all aspects of Tibetan cultural and political autonomy that have nationalist implications, which means almost all aspects of autonomy. This has been combined with continuous repression of opposition, "patriotic education" campaigns, and economic development that is intended to benefit loyal Tibetans as well as to support Chinese colonization.
China is unlikely to negotiate about increased Tibetan autonomy because Tibet already has as much autonomy as China is probably willing to allow. China cannot allow Tibetan autonomy sufficient to preserve Tibetan national identity because a separate Tibetan national identity is an inherent threat to China's national security and territorial integrity. Nor can autonomy be assumed without question to be a realistic option for Tibetans. Autonomy has no legal or political definition. Unlike self-determination, the nature of which is defined by the self in question, in this case the Tibetan nation, minority autonomy is defined by the majority state. The definition of Tibetan autonomy is entirely in the hands of China and China says that Tibetans already enjoy full cultural and political autonomy. Tibetan autonomy is thus incapable of satisfying Tibetans' desires for self-determination nor is it likely to be capable of preserving Tibetan cultural and national identity. Tibetan national identity poses a separatist threat to China, both Communist China and any conceivable China of the future. China cannot tolerate the survival of Tibetan national identity because it is the source of the Tibetan political issue: without Tibetan national identity there is no Tibetan political issue. China therefore aims to constantly restrict Tibetan autonomy in the hopes that, as predicted in Marxist theory, Tibetan religion, culture and nationalism will gradually diminish and be assimilated into Chinese cultural and national identity.
* Warren W. Smith, author of Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism
and Sino-Tibetan Relations.