The Tibetan and Chinese Prime Ministers Address the Self-Immolations

The Tibetan and Chinese Prime Ministers Address the Self-Immolations

posted Feb 21, 2012 6:23 PM by The Tibetan Political Review

By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review

In a strange coincidence, February 14 saw articles on both Lobsang Sangay, the Tibetan prime minister in exile, and Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, making statements on the self-immolation crisis in Tibet.  We take a close look at how the words chosen by both prime ministers reveal insights into their approaches on the issue.
The Tibetan Prime Minister

According to AP’s report of its interview, the Tibetan prime minister spoke about how China has sealed off Tibet.  Sangay also described his view of why the self-immolations are taking place:

“You can’t have hunger strikes, you can’t have demonstrations, you can’t write petitions [in Tibet].  Given such repressive policies and actions, Tibetans are pushed to the brink of desperation. They are thinking that perhaps this form of action will bring some attention to the grievances of the Tibetan people.”

Essentially, Sangay explains the self-immolations as acts of “desperation” motivated by seeking global “attention”.  It is wonderful that Sangay’s interview was carried by AP, bringing prominent coverage to this issue of the sort that the previous Tibetan exiled prime minister probably would not have received.  At the same time, for two reasons, his interview contained statements which have implications that are unfortunate or potentially unhelpful.

First, it is detrimental to portray such utterly selfless acts of resistance as merely acts of “desperation”.**  Desperation necessarily comes from despair.  While it would be arrogant for anyone to presume to know what was in the minds of these courageous individuals, we do not hear desperation when listening to Lama Sopa’s recorded last words, a hauntingly powerful call for Tibetan nationhood.  We do not see desperation when Ani Palden Choetso calmly raised her hands in prayer as she was engulfed in flames.

In our view, therefore, the word “desperation” diminishes the deep sacrifice and meaning of these self-immolations.  It falsely turns a powerful act of Tibetan resistance into a sign of Tibetan despair and helplessness.  This goes to the question of whether Tibetans in Tibet are passive victims, or agents with the power to change their own destiny.  Certainly the Central Tibetan Administration must take care to not be seen as encouraging more self-immolations.  But just as certainly, it owes it to courageous Tibetans to respect rather than diminish their sacrifice.

Second, it seems simplistic to describe the self-immolations as motivated by seeking global “attention”.  Again, we do not presume to know the minds of those brave individuals.  However, based partly on our own direct and indirect contacts in Tibet, many Tibetans in Tibet have a sophisticated understanding that the “free world” will not ride to Tibet’s rescue.  In Tibet there are no cries of “U.N.O. we want justice”.

Under this more expansive view, the self-immolations may bring outside attention, but that is secondary.  Primarily, the self-immolations unify the Tibetan people, including those who were lulled into a false sense that the political status quo might be acceptable.  The self-immolations also drive home to the Chinese regime that the Tibetan people will not give in, and force the Chinese people to confront the reality that the Tibetan people are not Chinese, and never will be.  If these are the goals, then there is a powerful strategy at work.

These apparent goals are based on a more complete understanding of true front lines of the Tibet-China struggle.  These goals are also separate from raising global “attention”, which is important but completely inadequate to solve the core issue of Tibet.

The Chinese Prime Minister

Wen’s statement on the self-immolation crisis is mainly important because it is the highest-level Chinese statement on the issue to date.  He mostly stuck to the standard boilerplate, with statements like “We respect and protect Tibet’s ecological environment and traditional culture, respect and protect religious freedom in Tibet,” and that Tibet is an “inseparable part” of China which the government has made great efforts at developing.

Interestingly, however, Wen also stated that “Our Tibetan countrymen are an important part of China’s family of ethnic groups.  They are our brothers.”  This demands the question: Why did Wen feel it was necessary to make this defensive statement?

Note that Tibetans are “they”, in contrast to “our” which presumably refers to the Chinese people.  Even if, in Wen’s view, Tibetans “belong” to China, he does not portray them as really Chinese.  (See the discussion above regarding the self-immolations strategically driving this point home.)

Wen also purposely tries to limit the discussion to the immolation of “a small number of monks”, to reduce the measure of the crisis.  Setting aside his omission of nuns, former monks and former nuns who were part of the lay community, Wen also notably ignores the demonstrations in Yushul, Nangchen, Drango, and elsewhere, where hundreds if not thousands of lay Tibetans took to the streets in resistance.


Conclusion

Wen Jiabao’s attempt to minimize the self-immolation crisis in Tibet is unsurprising.  His attempt to cover up the extent of the resistance is to be expected, and not much more needs to be said on this.

As for Lobsang Sangay’s statement, the prime minister should be acknowledged for being far more active in public diplomacy than his predecessor.

However, we are disappointed that the prime minister raised only the goal of international “attention”, ignoring the far more significant strategic developments in strengthening Tibetan unity and forcing a shift in Chinese perceptions.  In this sense, the Tibetan people in Tibet are taking the lead, which we hope the Central Tibetan Administration will eventually follow for the good of the entire Tibetan movement.

Because of these significant strategic developments, we believe that the self-immolations should be portrayed, not as acts of helpless despair, but as courageous acts of active resistance.

For a more detailed look at the word “desperation”, see “Beacons of Resistance, not Desperate Acts” by Christophe Besuchet.

This article originally included a reference to a “February 3 self-immolation of three lay herders in Serthar”.  New information suggests that reporting of this event was incorrect, underscoring yet again the importance of opening Tibet to independent journalists and diplomats.

Interview: Robert Barnett on Why Tibetans Are Setting Themselves on Fire

Interview: Robert Barnett on Why Tibetans Are Setting Themselves on Fire

February 24th, 2012 by Alex Ortolani

Tibetans offer prayers near mock coffins to represent the victims self-immolation during a rally in Siliguri, in the Indian state of West Bengal, on February 8, 2012. China said February 7 it would ‘resolutely crack down’ on any attempts to instigate violence in Tibetan-inhabited areas, where authorities have launched a deadly clampdown on protesters. (Diptendu Dutta/AFP/Getty Images)

Earlier this week a Tibetan monk became at least the 22nd person in the past year to commit self-immolation in protest at the Chinese government’s rule in Tibet. Robert Barnett, Director of the Modern Tibet Studies Program at Columbia University, says this is a new type of political protest for Tibetans, one that looks like it may become an ongoing form of dissent if the Chinese government does not change some of its policies in the region.

Asia Blog spoke to Barnett by telephone.

Why are monks and nuns deciding to use this particular form of protest against the Chinese government?

The reasons why they have chosen this method of protest are not exactly clear. People inside Tibet, especially in rural areas, are sometimes able to get radio news in Tibetan from outside sources such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, but probably know little if anything about the Tunisian self-immolation last year, let alone the Vietnamese self-immolations 50 years ago. But they would have heard about the demonstrations that lead to the Arab Spring, and this might have encouraged people in a general way to see popular protest as a way to bring about change.

But they may be choosing this method of protest because in the previous cycle of unrest in Tibet in 2008, when there were about 150 street demonstrations by very large groups, about 20 of those incidents spiraled down into chaos and violence. The violence had allowed the Chinese government to avoid addressing the underlying issues and complaints of the protestors, and self-immolation may be seen as a way to avoid the downside of traditional large-scale street protests: it sends a message to the government in a way that the protestors hope will not be easy to brush aside because it does not do damage to other people or to property, and does not involve unrest.

Robert Barnett

The protests call in general for “freedom” and for the Dalai Lama to be allowed to return to Tibet. They seem to have been triggered by a dramatic turn in policy in 1994, when the Chinese state decided to focus above all on attacking the Dalai Lama by forcing monks and nuns to denounce him and greatly increasing regulations concerning monasteries and religion. This policy was first implemented in the Tibet Autonomous Region, which is the western half of the Tibetan plateau around Lhasa, but in the last 10 years it has been gradually imposed, monastery by monastery, across the eastern half of the plateau, where most Tibetans live and where the current protests are taking place. It includes re-education programs in the monasteries, bans on worship of the Dalai Lama, downgrading of the role of Tibetan language in schools, encouragement of migration into Tibetan areas, and other restrictions. No-one knows why they decided to extend this policy to the eastern Tibetan areas, since until then they had been quite relaxed and peaceful since the late 1970s.

Is there any tradition to this particular kind of protest in Buddhist culture?

The Chinese press has been arguing that these protests violate Buddhist principles and rules, but in fact they resonate strongly with Buddhist tradition. Suicide is shunned in Buddhism if carried out for personal reasons, but self-sacrifice for a noble cause is highly regarded. There are many stories about the Buddha doing this in former lives, most famously one in which he sacrifices himself by giving his body to a dying tigress so she can feed her cubs. So an act that is done for the good of the community is considered noble, and especially so if it is done by a member of the clergy.

It is because these acts have been done by monks, nuns or former monks, that it has been so hard for the Chinese government to discredit the protestors — it would be very different if lay people had been involved. The government had almost total success in discrediting five Chinese people, said by the government to be adherents of the Falun Gong sect, who staged a mass self-immolation in Beijing in 2001: the event was presented as proof that these people had been brainwashed and manipulated by the Falun Gong. But despite some tentative attempts by the Chinese press to do this with the Tibetan monks and nuns, these efforts have failed, largely because they are so widely respected within the Tibetan community.

Why can’t the two sides find common ground concerning Tibet’s governance?

One way to understand the Tibetan-Chinese issue is to look at the question of its status, whether it should be part of China, or, if it is a part of China, what degree of autonomy it should have. This is an issue that goes back at least 100 years, to when a Chinese army first tried to annex Tibet and to integrate it into China’s territory. It’s something that is likely to take a very long time to resolve.

But there is a second issue that is easy to confuse with the first, which are the policies that China has introduced more recently, especially the 1994 decision to declare the Dalai Lama an enemy, and other issues that were stepped up at the same time concerning reeducation, language use, and over-rapid economic development. There are more recent issues emerging now as well, especially environment-related issues such as the forced settlement of nomads and rampant mining. Because these secondary factors are not set in stone and are constantly taking new forms, they represent a kind of opportunity for China, one that they could compromise on fairly easily. If they did so, it would generate some relief and allow more time to try to sort out the primary issues concerning autonomy and status. There has been no sign of any movement so far even on these secondary issues. China has a weak, consensus-based and highly conservative leadership system, which makes it very difficult for the leaders to agree on a bold move concerning a core issue of national sovereignty and pride, so any concessions will be very small.

Is there an end in sight to these self-immolations?

China sees itself as having been consistently generous to Tibetans since at least the early 1980s because it has run large subsidy programs to boost economic development in Tibetan areas, and because it sees the protests as plots by the Dalai Lama or other exiles designed to “split” China by creating an independent Tibet. The exiles deny this but at the same time use very strong nationalist rhetoric, as one would expect. So, though a negotiated solution between the two leaderships can never be ruled out, it seems unlikely in the current climate.

Meanwhile, the eastern Tibetans whose anger has now been roused are resolute and strong-willed, with a long and bitter memory of various Chinese attacks on their areas and monasteries over the last century, and they are defending their core values. So the current tensions are not going to disappear without some concession from the Party. That concession would not have to be huge for people to decide not to kill themselves —Tibetans, even activists, inside Tibet are surprisingly moderate in most cases and generally pragmatic, so even a token gesture by the state would have significant impact. For example, the Party could stop forced political reeducation and it could stop its demonization campaign against the Dalai Lama — policies that it has not applied in inland China for decades — and it could regulate internal migration into Tibet as it does with Hong Kong. If they don’t do that these tensions will increase, and if more people get killed, things could spiral out of control and become very difficult to resolve in any meaningful way.

It was reported that in the latest self-immolation a thousand people surrounded the body to protect it from the police. Why might they do this?

In Tibetan culture, when someone dies you disturb the body as little as possible after death. Instead, special ceremonies and rituals are carried out in the hope that the consciousness will be calmed, giving it a better chance of a more beneficial rebirth. But as in any religion, there are many layers of explanation. For example, in general there is a view that it’s important to dispose of the body in an appropriate way, such as feeding it to birds or fish, since this is a kind of generosity, rather than the secular cremation method used by the Chinese state. In this case, these self-immolations are clearly seen by the local community not as a suicide by a desperate individual but as an act of dedication for the benefit of others, so local people would have wished to show respect to the dead person by ensuring that the appropriate rituals are carried out by the clergy. So there are many factors here besides the obvious objections to the confiscation by the police of the dead person’s body.


Exiled PM wants 'fact finding' mission in Tibet

Exiled PM wants ‘fact finding’ mission in Tibet

Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Broadcast: 21/02/2012

Reporter: Emma Alberici

Exiled Tibetan prime minister Lobsang Sangay says he wants the international community to send a fact finding mission to investigate human rights abuses in Tibet.

Transcript

EMMA ALBERICI, PRESENTER: The Prime Minister of the exiled government of Tibet is Lobsang Sangay. He’s currently visiting the US, and he joins us tonight from Boston. Lobsang Sangay, thank you very much for being there.

LOBSANG SANGAY, PM, TIBETAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE: Thank you very much.

EMMA ALBERICI: Young monks and nuns, teenagers, setting themselves on fire in the streets – what is so desperate that is leading them to resort to such violent protests?

LOBSANG SANGAY: It’s really tragic and sad to see, so far, 24 Tibetans – some very young and some old – giving up their lives for freedom in Tibet and return of his holiness the Dalai Lama. What they’re saying is the occupation of Tibet should not continue; the repression of Tibetans should not continue. They would choose to die than leave. This is a sad commentary on the failed policies of the Chinese government.

EMMA ALBERICI: What is it exactly, what are you hearing about the individual stories of these people, the personal battles that have led them to this point?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Yes, in Tibet, Tibetans cannot protest, they cannot peacefully gather. If you do, you might get shot at; and you can’t have hunger strike, you can’t have rallies, and Tibetans see this the only or most drastic way of protesting against the repressive policies – because, let’s say, in monasteries, photograph of his Holiness the Dalai Lama is banned there overall, but you’re made to denounce the picture of the Lama who they revere. So much restriction is imposed that many choose to leave or expelled. Hence, they’re saying, given the circumstances – political, economic, social – they’re saying it’s so repressive they will give up their lives, and made a commentary that freedom be restored in Tibet.

EMMA ALBERICI: Has the Chinese government been moved by these brutal public suicides?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Unfortunately there is blatant discrimination as to how the Chinese government treat Chinese people and their protest, and Tibetan peoples’ protest. For example, the local party official in Lhasa has declared quote-unquote ‘war’ on protestors and Tibetans. Which government in the world would declare war against their own people? They have sent hundreds and thousands of troops to Tibetan people. As it is, Tibet is under undeclared martial law. There’s a Chinese writer who says that in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet, there are more Chinese than Tibetans, there are more civilians’ cameras than windows, and there are more – if I may add – more guns that [inaudible] for Tibetan people. Under such circumstances the Chinese government and its hardline policies is discriminating and treating Tibetans quite badly.

EMMA ALBERICI: China’s vice president Xi Jinping visited the United States last week. He’s expected to take over the country’s leadership next year. Now, Barack Obama rolled out the diplomatic red carpet for him. Are you shown that same respect of office in Washington?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Well, you know, we always want good relationship between China and any other country – be it US or Australia – and the president Obama and the state department – the congress leaders particularly – raise issues about Tibet to the vice president Xi Jinping. And we also appreciate foreign ministers – Kevin Rudd’s January 15 statement on Tibet, and him raising the issue with Xi Jinping in 2010. But we would urge international community not just to raise statements, and not just to raise issues and issue statements, but to take concrete action. We want the Australian government or the US to send delegations to Tibet as to find out what exactly is happening, why Tibetans are self-immolating. Why they’re protesting, why the repressive policies of the Chinese government is resented by Tibetan people. This kind of fact-finding delegation will provide a better light as to what are the main grievances of the Tibetan people, and how best to find solutions.

EMMA ALBERICI: Have you specifically asked the Australian government to do that given this is our region?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Yes, we have actually, from the Tibetan parliament and [inaudible], and we have written letters to different heads of state urging them, and we have issued open statements to international community to send fact-finding delegation to the United Nations as well – to send special investigator to Tibetan areas, and for journalists to have access to the area so we know exactly what is happening. If the Chinese government is so suspicious, they should allow liberal Chinese scholars to Tibetan areas and do investigation and report to the Chinese government, so that we can find a win/win peaceful solution to the Tibet issue so that these vicious cycle of violence after violence and repression not continue in Tibet.

EMMA ALBERICI: Why is it then that countries like Australia and the US aren’t sending those delegations in on fact-finding missions, as you’ve requested?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Well, the US consulate in Chengdu did try to send some staff members to Tibetan areas, but they could not access the area. And I also urge the Australian Government to, you know, send fact-finding delegation to Tibet, and Prime Minister Julia Gillard has been quite strong on human rights, and the Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd when he visited Beijing he said, you know, ‘Human rights is equally important to economic rights’, which should be the basic principle on which international communities should approach the Chinese government.

EMMA ALBERICI: Trade with China is significant for Australia. It’s adding millions of jobs here over the past decade. To what extent do you think that economic dependency compromises the Australian Government’s ability to condemn Beijing’s human rights record and do something about it?

LOBSANG SANGAY: I hope not, because the Australia was founded on the principle of human rights and universality of freedom. If economic interests takes priority over everything else – and what is really is the purpose of a government and a state if basic human rights are not respected in one’s country and not respected and commented in other places as well. So, basic human rights and freedom has to be one of the core principles of any government, so Australian Government and Australia, as much as they have trade relationship with China, they must take a stand on human rights – because again, if I remember correctly, Kevin Rudd made a formal apology to Aboriginals in Australia. This sort of action should be urged to the Chinese government so they will be healing, so that the president Hu Jintao’s call for harmony within China will be practised in reality. To have real harmony, there has to be healing, and there has to be a way to solve this issue of Tibet. Not through guns and violence.

EMMA ALBERICI: It was self-immolation that triggered the unrest which brought down Tunisia’s leader, and led to copycat protests in Egypt and Libya. Have Tibetans been emboldened by the Arab Spring, do you think?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Arab Spring, or for that matter, Colour Revolution, or the freeing of Nelson Mandela, or the coming down of Berlin Wall – all these are positive direction events in the world history. So, any kind of assertion of freedom is welcome, and Tibetans see this as positive direction in the world. But I can’t say Arab Spring necessarily prompted Tibetans to protest against the repressive policies of the Chinese government, because Tibetans have been doing it since 1950s. Tibet has been under occupation for the last now-60 years, so what we are protesting against is occupation and repression for so many years, and the 2008 uprising, nationwide in Tibet, made it clear that Tibetans do not tolerate and accept the continuing hardline policies of Beijing.

EMMA ALBERICI: China, along with Russia, is blocking a UN resolution calling for the Syrian regime to step down and stop attacking its own people. It was hardly a surprise, was it, that China would push back against any precedent-setting attempt to usurp a country’s right to reject democracy?

LOBSANG SANGAY: That’s true. As China rises – and as many countries, including Australia, are keenly analysing as to what kind of China is going to be in the international forum – one should take note of vetoing of resolution on Syria and such, you know, violent crackdown on Tibetans as to what kind of heartland policies and actions the Chinese government is capable of. So this is a sad commentary on China, and it tarnishes the image. As long as the Chinese government does not solve the issue of Tibet, their image and respect in the international community will be diminished considerably.

EMMA ALBERICI: Now, you’re the prime minister of Tibet, albeit in exile, and yet you’ve never been to Tibet, as I understand it. When do you expect to be able to get into the country so you can more properly represent your people?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Yes, after His Holiness the Dalai Lama transferred his political power, I am the political head of the Tibetan people. Unfortunately I was not allowed to visit Tibet in 2005, but I gave up my job at Harvard Law School, where I spent the last 16 years, and I have left America, actually, and returned to Dharamsala – a beautiful hill station in India to serve for Tibet and Tibetan people. Now, I’ve given up America and Harvard to work for this cause, because I do believe, sincerely and wholeheartedly, I will return to Tibet one day soon where there will be freedom, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama will be in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet.

EMMA ALBERICI: Is there any softening of the position in Beijing that you’re noticing?

LOBSANG SANGAY: At the moment, not. In fact, there is more hard line reaction. They’re sending more troops. They’re cracking down on more Tibetans and no tourists are allowed now, no journalists are allowed. Even Chinese visitors are discouraged from visiting Tibet. So they’re really sealed off. With the Tibetan New Year, Losar, beginning tomorrow, and the 10th March, National Uprising Day, coming soon, we are extremely worried as to what kind of hard line policies and crackdown the Chinese government is going to implement. The rest of the world will not know how many Tibetans actually suffered, maybe died… may die under such circumstances.

EMMA ALBERICI: In what way die? You don’t mean self-immolations?

LOBSANG SANGAY: Not just self-immolation, because any kind of peaceful gatherings is seen as threat by the Chinese government, and we have reports on January 23 and 24 where they were shot at and many Tibetans were killed and many were injured. Now, as to protests inside China, by Chinese people, they’re allowed… not only are they allowed, their grievances are addressed. As far as Tibetans are concerned, any kind of gathering is seen as threat to the national security, and they even get shot at and arrested, so these are the things we are really worried.

EMMA ALBERICI: Lobsang Sangay, thank you very much for being there for us this evening.

LOBSANG SANGAY: Thank you very much.

Kalon Tripa’s Losar Statement

Kalon Tripa’s Losar Statement

Tashi Delek to Tibetans and friends around the world! Warm Losar  greetings from Dharamsala, which falls on February 22.

As requested, please do not celebrate Losar this year, but do  observe traditional and spiritual rituals by going to the  monastery, making offerings, and lighting butter lamps for all  those Tibetans inside Tibet who have sacrificed and suffered under  the repressive policies of the Chinese government.

News from Tibet continues to be grim. Tibet is virtually sealed off  with foreigners not allowed to enter. Even Chinese tourists are  prevented from visiting Tibet, and the military buildup is very  heavy. [The Chinese government has launched a massive crackdown on  Tibetans who visited India for the Kalachakra Teachings. Several  hundred Tibetans have been detained and are being forced to undergo  political re-education [please see the news release from Human  Rights Watch] . We are extremely worried over what is happening and  what might happen inside Tibet. Under such circumstances, please do  pray for all Tibetans inside Tibet especially on the third, eight,  tenth and fifteenth day of Losar, as these are auspicious days.

March 10, our National Uprising Day, is coming up soon. There will  be many other activities as well where Tibetans and our friends  will be requested to participate. Please remember and observe the  guidelines issued by CTA, which is to organize and participate in  events peacefully, legally and with dignity. Peacefully because non-  violence is our core principle. Legally as we are in a democratic  country and have to follow the law of the land, and with dignity  because we are seeking our freedom and dignity

Tibet Lobby Day is also coming up when Tibetans and friends lobby  parliaments or the congress and share with members our concern over  Tibet and the continuing repressive policies of the Chinese  government. This year is especially important given the unfolding  tragedy inside Tibet. It is important that we do the best we can to  approach as many Congressional members and Parliamentarians as  possible so as to make them aware. If possible, please try to have  a resolution passed in the parliament or have a good debate on the  situation inside Tibet. This way the suffering of Tibetans inside  Tibet and their voices will be heard loud and clear around the world, particularly by the leaders in Beijing.

I would like to thank all those Tibetans and friends who  participated in the global vigil on February 8. According to  various accounts, hundreds of activities were organized around the  world, thousands participated, and the day was very successful.

In conclusion, I want to say to our dear brothers and sisters inside Tibet that you are in our hearts and prayers every day.

New Self-Immolation Amid Tensions

New Self-Immolation Amid Tensions

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/tensions-02082012101354.html

February 8, 2012— Another Tibetan protester set himself ablaze Wednesday to protest Chinese rule in a Tibetan-populated area of China’s western Sichuan province, according to Tibetan sources in exile.

Twenty-one Tibetans, mostly monks and former monks, have set fire to themselves in a wave of self-immolation protests in ethnic Tibetan regions of China since March 2009 as Beijing has stepped up a crackdown on monasteries amid charges of human rights abuses.

Wednesday’s self-immolation took place at 6:30 p.m. local time at the No. 2 primary school in the main town of Ngaba county, in the Ngaba (in Chinese, Aba) prefecture, India-based monks Losang Yeshe and Kanyag Tsering said in a statement to RFA, citing contacts in the region.

The still-unidentified Tibetan man shouted slogans before self-immolating, they said.

“The protester appeared to be a monk,” Yeshe and Tsering said, quoting a source, “but his name and place of origin and other details are not known.”

“He was immediately taken away by soldiers and police,” they said, adding that two other monks were detained in the vicinity.

“Their identities are also unknown,” Yeshe and Tsering said.

Global protests, prayers

Security in Ngaba particularly has been extremely tight as Tibetans across the globe planned prayers and protests on Wednesday to pay respect to compatriots who have sacrificed their lives for the Tibetan cause.

“The Tibetans in Tibet are aware of the exile Tibetans’ global solidarity protest today, and as a result there was a massive security presence in Ngaba. During the daytime, almost no Tibetans were seen in the street,” Tsering told RFA by telephone from the Indian town of Dharamsala, where the Dalai Lama has been living in exile.

“This self-immolation took place in the evening, when the security forces had considerably withdrawn from the scene,” he said, citing contacts in the region.

“The scene of the self-immolation protest was not in a public gathering square. It was in a little secluded area. The news is confirmed by five different sources, from Bejing, Tibet, and in exile,” he said.

Rising tensions

The latest self-immolation protest came five days after sources said that three Tibetans set themselves on fire in Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county, also in Sichuan province.

Serthar was among three counties in Sichuan province where Tibetans protested against Chinese rule two weeks ago in which rights and exile groups believe at least six were killed and 60 injured, some critically. The other counties were Draggo (in Chinese, Luhuo) and Dzamthang (in Chinese, Rangtang).

Official Chinese media reported only two Tibetans were killed in the incidents after “mobs” armed with, guns, knives, and stones attacked local police.

Tensions have risen in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and in Tibetan-populated areas of Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu provinces following a recent wave of protests against Chinese rule and calling for the return of the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader.

Chinese authorities have ramped up security across Tibetan areas following the protests, sources said.

Telephone and other communication links to the protest areas have mostly been cut.

Reported by Rigdhen Dolma and Dorjee Damdul for RFA’s Tibetan service. Written in English by Richard Finney.

Kalon Tripa Calls for More Concrete Actions from Int’l Community on Tibet

Kalon Tripa Calls for More Concrete Actions from Int’l Community on Tibet

9th February 2012

DHARAMSHALA: Expressing grave concern over the well-being of Tibetans in Tibet in view of the Chinese military build-up in Tibet, Kalon Tripa has called for more substantive support from the world community to end the Chinese government’s repression in Tibet.

“Hundreds of convoys carrying Chinese military personnel with automatic machine guns are moving towards Tibet. We fear many Tibetans might face unfortunate experiences,” Kalon Tripa Dr Lobsang Sangay told hundreds of Tibetans and supporters gathered at a solidarity vigil in Dharamsala today.

“We really feel the Chinese government is preparing for something really tragic. Hence it is critical that the international community must intervene now to show support for Tibet and Tibetan people,” Dr Sangay said.

“The Tibetans in Tibet are giving up their lives because the occupation of Tibet and repressive policies of the Chinese government is unacceptable,” Kalon Tripa said.

“We really appreciate statements issued by different countries like the US and European countries. But we would like seek some more concrete actions to send delegates to Tibet to investigate the reality and the military build-up in Tibet, deaths and torture of Tibetans, and the reasons why there is repression, why Tibetans are

self-immolating,” Kalon Tripa added. He urged the US to pass the Senate resolution to show support to the Tibetan people.

Kalon Tripa urged the international media, including those working in China, to make more efforts to go to Tibet and objectively report why the Tibetans are self-immolating. “If the world media cannot go to Tibet, we never know what else is happening inside Tibetan areas, and how many more Tibetans are being killed and dying,” he added.

Kalon Tripa said the Chinese government’s response towards the Chinese people’s protest in Wukang in Guangdong province show the discrimination against the Tibetan people. He said Guangdong governor fired local communist party officials, gave powers to the protesting groups and addressed their grievances. “Whereas in Tibet, several hundred Tibetans gathered in Dragko area, but the Chinese police indiscriminately shot Tibetans and killed them. So, the world is watching that there is a blatant discrimination towards Tibetans because Chinese can protest, their grievances addressed, whereas Tibetans cannot protest,” Kalon Tripa said.

“If the Chinese government thinks the Tibet issue cannot solved through violence, force and intimidation, then it’s not going to happen because the Tibetan spirit is strong. The Tibetan spirit would remain strong until freedom is restored in Tibet and His Holiness the Dalai Lama return to Tibet,” Kalon Tripa said.

“As we gathered in Dharamsala today, we can say with pride that we are joined by many others around the world from the US, Canada, France, England, eastern European countries, South Africa, South America and Asia with hundreds and thousands of Tibetans to show solidarity with Tibetans inside Tibet and to pray for those who have sacrificed their lives,” Kalon Tripa said.

“We will not let your voices go unheard, we will not let sacrifices go unattended,” Kalon Tripa told Tibetans living in Tibet.

Thousands of Tibetan and supporters took part in a prayer service at the Tsuglagkhang, the main temple, to show solidarity with the Tibetans in Tibet.

What fiture for the Sino-Tibetan Dailogue?

What fiture for the Sino-Tibetan Dailogue?

By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review

“What is the sound of one hand clapping?”  This Zen Buddhist koan is sometimes cited by those who follow the ups and downs – mostly downs – of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue.  The Tibetan side wants to negotiate a political resolution; the Chinese side either refuses to discuss anything beyond the personal status of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, or refuses to even acknowledge that there is a dialogue.

Now, there are two questions of new urgency that Tibetans must address in relation to the future of this dialogue.  First, Tibetans must clarify internally who will decide Tibetan policy on the dialogue process and control the envoys.  Second, Tibetans must decide how to respond externally to China’s growing intransigence in restarting talks.

The first question is illustrated by a November 2011 statement by Lodi Gyari, the Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.  The second question is illustrated by some December 2011 statements by Zhu Weiqun, the Communist Party official responsible for the Tibet talks.

Besides these two main topics, the end of this editorial has some new questions for future consideration by the Tibetan people.

Tibetans’ Internal Question: Who Decides, Who Controls?

Gyari’s November 11 statement declared:

“With the changes in the CTA’s structure, the Kashag [Cabinet] informed me in May 2011 of its intention to appoint me to a position under it…  I responded by reminding the Kashag that I had retired from the CTA civil service long time back…  Following the recent changes in the governance system, I have ceased any involvement with issues relating to the Central Tibetan Administration.”

While this may seem out of the blue, it followed the devolution of power from His Holiness to an elected leadership.  Gyari noted that with the devolution, he could no longer operate as essentially the CTA’s envoy as well as His Holiness’s.  (This problem would have been prevented if His Holiness had remained ceremonial head of state as advocated by some.)

A close reading of Gyari’s statement also suggests that his position as Special Envoy did not automatically end when His Holiness devolved his powers.  Legally, this may be a solid argument.  Gyari was appointed as His Holiness’s envoy in the early 1990s through the then-proper procedure, i.e. nomination by the Kashag and formal appointment by His Holiness.  His Holiness remains His Holiness.  Thus, Gyari’s term as Special Envoy arguably continues until his resignation or removal by His Holiness.

1. What Went On?

The Kashag’s May 14, 2011 statement, to which Gyari refers, announced that Gyari and his colleague Kelsang Gyaltsen “will hold their posts until further notice.”  The Kashag’s announcement took for granted that it has the power to appoint (or dismiss) Gyari.

Gyari’s response apparently was to “remind” the Kashag that it had no such power over his position.  However, it is also important to note that this reminder was apparently delivered in private, as implied by a close reading of Gyari’s statement.  Gyari did not say anything publicly until November 11.

On August 8, Lobsang Sangay formally took the reigns as Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.  During his first press conference that same day , he declared, “We will appoint an envoy in the name of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and send him or her to Beijing to talk about the substantive issues.”  Thus, it was announced in a prominent public forum that Sangay intended to appoint an envoy (presumably but not necessarily Gyari) who would wear two “hats”: one as the CTA’s envoy, and one as His Holiness’s envoy.

On October 13, Sangay further stated his “firm commitment in finding a mutually acceptable solution in the spirit of the Middle-Way Approach.  I have therefore asked the two envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to make efforts to resume the dialogue at the earliest convenience.”

Gyari’s statement came on November 11.  Essentially, he declared that he does not work for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.

2. What Now?

We believe that the elected Tibetan leadership should be in charge of the dialogue process to the maximum extent possible.  The leadership has the popular mandate from the electorate, and they also can be held accountable for the success or shortcomings of their policy.  The problem comes with defining what is the “maximum extent possible”.

In an ideal world, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile would decide dialogue policy, and would appoint and instruct the representatives to any talks that take place.  However, this is not an ideal world.

The reason is that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) categorically refuses to talk with Tibet’s exiled government.  (Note: the Tibetan dialogue is with the United Front Work Department of the CCP, not the Chinese government.  The CCP also has a Tibet Work Coordination Group where the United Front has a major voice.)  Simply put, the CCP is afraid of implying any sort of legitimacy for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, because it knows that its own rule over Tibet comes only through force.  Tibetans should always be mindful that the real cause of the democratic deficit in the dialogue process is the CCP’s immature and intransigent attitude, not any power contest internal to the Tibetan side.

It is also important to note that the formal policy of the U.S. government is also to support negotiation between Beijing and “the Dalai Lama or his representatives”.  Because the U.S. executive branch does not recognize the exiled Tibetan government, it acknowledges no Tibetan government role in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue.

A. Who Decides the Dialogue Policy?

From an internal Tibetan perspective, there may be a cooperative solution to these non-ideal circumstances.  The exiled administration will recognize that His Holiness retains unparalleled devotion inside Tibet, and the CCP will only talk (if at all) with His Holiness’s envoys.  Yet at the same time, the elected Tibetan leadership holds the popular electoral mandate, and is the legal continuity of the sovereign government of Tibet.

Thus, at the level of deciding dialogue policy behind closed doors, it makes sense for the exiled leadership to informally coordinate with Gyari and other officers in the Ganden Phodrang Trust (previously called His Holiness’s Private Office).  This may already occur through the mechanism of the Task Force, though we have no inside information.

The parties involved might consider refraining from public statements about who is in charge.  This admittedly hurts democratic accountability, and maybe pride, but it might be the price of dealing with an anti-democratic CCP.

B. Who Controls the Envoys?

The next question is: who should have the power to appoint and direct the envoys?  When the exiled government insisted that it controls the envoys, it asserted itself as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people.  The danger, however, is that the CCP will seize on the excuse to petulantly reject all further talks.  Indeed, it is our speculation that Gyari’s November 11 statement sought to repair some damage by refuting the exiled leadership’s assertions of control.

Now, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile must choose a better balance between principle and pragmatic flexibility.  It could continue to claim power over the envoys, resulting in a deadlock, or it could embrace flexibility, potentially opening up diplomatic possibilities (but with an opponent who states that it is unwilling to discuss anything of substance).

Specifically with respect to Gyari, the exiled government must also make a decision.  It can continue to claim power over his position or perhaps state that Gyari is only His Holiness’s private envoy, competent to discuss only issues related to His Holiness.  Or alternatively, it can alter its position and acknowledge Gyari as His Holiness’s envoy, who is also competent to represent the Tibetan side in any dialogue, with no public role for the exiled government.

If the exiled government takes a more flexible route, this would not mean it renounces its claim to be the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people.  It would be entirely appropriate for the government to ask His Holiness and his envoys to take on the formal role of representing the Tibetan people in dialogue with the CCP.  Other governments have turned to distinguished persons to resolve conflicts.  As stated above, the exiled government could continue to quietly consult with His Holiness’s envoys behind closed doors, and devote its public energies to the equally vital task of domestic improvement and societal resource-building.

From the constitutional perspective, the Tibetan Charter is notably unclear as to whether the Kashag has a role in the appointment of the next Special Envoy of His Holiness (note again that Gyari’s role probably continues until his resignation or removal).  The amended Article 1(3) gives His Holiness the right to “give the title/position of envoy of His Holiness to the Kashag-appointed Office of Tibet Representatives/Envoys and Special Envoys.”  From the Tibetan text, it is unclear whether it is only an Office of Tibet Representative who is “Kashag-appointed”, or also a Special Envoy: kashag gyis bsko-‘dzugs byes-pai’ sku-tsab don-chod dang dmigs-sel sku-tsab.  Depending on whether or not the ambiguous language was intentional, this clause’s drafting was either masterful or negligent.  In any case, the Charter is not much help in resolving this question.

The overall choice between principle and flexibility, deadlock and pseudo-dialogue, is one that the Tibetan people should carefully consider.  This much is clear: if the Tibetan people want to seek dialogue with the CCP, it will likely be fatal for the exiled government to continue to claim to be in charge.  Whether the Tibetan people decide that it is worth this price is another question, for the sake of a dialogue that may or may not happen, and which may or may not go anywhere.  There is no easy answer for a people who have compromised and given up so much already, and for whom dialogue may hold out only a thin hope, one that has been dashed so many times before.

Tibetans’ External Question: How to Respond to China?

As if the dialogue process were not hard enough, the Tibetan people face an opponent who has repeatedly claimed that it is uninterested in talking (ideal for establishing a strong bargaining position).  The Chinese side is led by a Communist Party official named Zhu Weiqun (vice-director of the CCP’s United Front Work Department).

Comrade Zhu has recently made some rather acerbic and inflammatory statements, which is what one would expect from scorched-earth Chinese negotiating tactics.  Indeed, it is perhaps unsurprising that he uses the language of a leftist hack, since so far it has worked.  To date it has been the Tibetan side that has given all the concessions, which strengthens the Chinese position and weakens the exiled Tibetan government in its domestic constituency.  Presumably, Comrade Zhu has enjoyed some bureaucratic rewards for that.

In relation to the self-immolation crisis in Tibet, Comrade Zhu noted in December that “I can honestly say to our friends that even if such a thing happens again, the direction of the Chinese government’s policies in Tibet and our attitude toward the Dalai clique’s struggle will not change in any way.”

He declared categorically that China would never speak with the CTA, arguing that it “lacked legality”.  He also blamed “interference” by the Kalon Tripa for the failure of the talks to restart, likely referring to the envoy issue.

Speaking to European Parliament members in December, Comrade Zhu complained about Europeans being willing “to accept what the Dalai Lama says rather than what we are saying”.  However, in a comment lacking any sense of civility, he stated that there is “little we can do to change this mentality but the thing I would say is that time is on our side.”

So how should the Tibetan side respond to a dialogue “partner” who declares that his side will never change their policy, will never talk with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and intends to simply outlive His Holiness?

This is a discussion the Tibetan people should have. Among the related questions that need asking:

  • Should Tibetans carry on as before, asking the CCP to restart talks led by Comrade Zhu?  One should doubt the prospects for a negotiated solution under Comrade Zhu.  A Canadian intelligence commentary calls United Front work “China’s version of psychological warfare”: it serves to co-opt non-Communist leaders and use them to neutralize CCP critics, including among ethnic and religious groups.  The Tibetan envoy is currently faced with the near-impossible task of seeking modification of the very “ethnic” policies designed by the United Front itself.  Presumably, any United Front official concerned about his career would not repudiate his department’s own work.  From the perspective of bureaucratic interest, there is a problem expecting the “anti-splittist” bureaucracy to resolve the very issue that its power and resources are based upon.  On the contrary, Comrade Zhu’s interest is likely in fulfilling his mission to protect the Party, guarding his department’s policy decisions and bureaucratic prerogatives, and advancing his career, not in solving a larger problem in the interests of the Chinese and Tibetan people.
  • Should Tibetans push for a good-faith (or less bad-faith) dialogue partner other than Comrade Zhu, perhaps someone in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee or the government’s State Council?  The CCP’s United Front department has historically dealt with Hong Kong and Taiwan, but China’s State Council also formally or informally has offices that manage relations with those territories.  Couldn’t there be a similar State Council office to institutionalize the Tibet dialogue and transfer the process away from the very department who bureaucratically benefits from continuing the “anti-splittist” crusade: i.e. the leftist United Front department?  For Tibet, whether this unlikely change becomes possible may indicate how serious the Chinese side is about actually resolving the issue.
  • Should Tibetans say “we tried”, and state that they remain open to dialogue but that the Chinese side is unwilling to reciprocate?  By honestly acknowledging the impasse, would this open up the discussion to considering other options, including reasserting Tibet’s claim to sovereignty and independence for a reinvigorated long-term freedom struggle?  Certainly, the experiences of numerous countries like Lithuania and East Timor serve to remind that all empires crumble, and there are many ways for small colonized nations to lay the groundwork to seize such an opportunity if they wish.
  • Should Tibetans consider a really “outside the box” idea?  What about accepting a division between the questions of His Holiness’s personal status and the political situation in Tibet?  Previously, His Holiness has always stated that the real issue is the 6 million Tibetan people, which the Chinese side always rejected.  With the devolution of power, the responsibility for the 6 million Tibetan people primarily rests with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (though His Holiness remains the spiritual leader and source of refuge).  Now, with the exiled government carrying on the political struggle, is His Holiness free to consider under what circumstances he would be willing to return to Tibet, separate from the issue of reaching a permanent political solution?  Since the CCP says they will only discuss His Holiness’s status and return, how would the dynamics change if His Holiness’s reply as a private citizen was to take China up on its offer?

Conclusion

Certainly, there are sensitive issues involved here, and officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and Ganden Phodrang Trust will (or should) speak cautiously.  However, nothing should stop the Tibetan people from debating this topic, since the dialogue process is carried out from the Tibetan side in their name.

The Taiwanese experience shows that democratic debate is possible even on “sensitive” issues dealing with China.  Taiwan and China have developed the so-called “1992 Consensus”, which sidesteps (some would say obscures) the dispute by allowing both sides to pretend that they are the “real” China.  Neither government will admit openly that this is a bit of a word game, but the Taiwan-China agreement works even with open discussion and criticism by the Taiwanese people.  Indeed, the journal Foreign Affairs even reports that Taiwanese officials “privately acknowledge the absurdity” of the consensus, which is a “kind of mantra the Taiwanese government must chant in order to have good relations with China”.  Surely, there is a lesson somewhere in there.

In the Tibetan case, this editorial doesn’t claim to have any answers, and merely poses some questions that we believe are important to ask.  Furthermore, we take no position on what outcomes we support.  Instead, we have tried our best to present the issues as we see them, and their logical consequences, based on publicly-available information.  These are difficult issues requiring sustained democratic discussion by the Tibetan people.  Hopefully at the end of this discussion lies a better policy and a stronger democracy.